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In recent years, several hacking attacks have broken the security of quantum cryptography implementations by
exploiting the presence of losses and the ability of the eavesdropper to tune detection efficiencies. We present a
simple attack of this form that applies to any protocol in which the key is constructed from the results of untrusted
measurements performed on particles coming from an insecure source or channel. Because of its generality, the
attack applies to a large class of protocols, from standard prepare-and-measure to device-independent schemes.
Our attack gives bounds on the critical detection efficiencies necessary for secure quantum distribution, which
show that the implementation of most partly device independent solutions is, from the point of view of detection
efficiency, almost as demanding as fully device-independent ones. We also show how our attack implies the
existence of a form of bound randomness, namely non-local correlations in which a non-signalling eavesdropper
can find out a posteriori the result of any implemented measurement.
Over the past few decades the problem of bridging the gap
between realistic implementation of Quantum Key Distribu-
tion (QKD) protocols and their theoretical security proofs has
attracted a lot of attention. The security of standard QKD pro-
tocols [1, 2] relies on a very detailed modeling of the preparing
and measuring devices. However, unavoidable imperfections
of the devices or unnoticed failures lead in practice to devia-
tions from the model used to prove security – deviations that
can be taken advantage of by a potential eavesdropper. In-
deed, standard QKD protocols, being dependent on the accu-
racy with which the devices are described, can typically suffer
attacks, for instance on the detectors [3].
To overcome these problems a new paradigm was proposed,
adopting the device-independent (DI) framework [4]: In this
scenario no assumptions are made either on the source of the
shared system or on the internal working of the devices, which
are treated like “black boxes”. In this context the only ob-
ject one relies on is the statistics of inputs and outputs, and
the security of a device-independent quantum key distribu-
tion (DIQKD) protocol is guaranteed by the nonlocal char-
acter of these statistics [5]. The DI scenario allows for the
most general and powerful quantum certification protocols as
it depends on very few assumptions. Nevertheless, their im-
plementations are demanding because they require very high
detection efficiencies to close the detection loophole (e.g. with
photonic implementations [5, 6]).
In order to make the experimental implementations less
demanding other scenarios between standard and fully DI
QKD have been introduced. In these intermediate scenar-
ios the parties involved add some extra assumptions to the
fully-DI scheme. The focus is still on the input/output statis-
tics but with an intermediate level of trust between the fully-
DI framework and the device-dependent one. For instance,
semi-device-independent (SDI) protocols have been proposed
where one makes an assumption on the dimension of the in-
volved quantum systems but, apart from this assumption, the
devices are still uncharacterized [7]. From an implementa-
tion point of view, the advantage of SDI protocols is that
they do not require entanglement and can be implemented
in a prepare-and-measure configuration. Another class of in-
termediate scenario, known as one-sided device-independent
(1SDI) [8–10], is based upon quantum steering [11] which
consists of a bipartite scenario in which one of the parties
trusts his measuring devices but the other does not.
All these different QKD solutions are based on differ-
ent assumptions and, thus, offer different levels of secu-
rity. Although different QKD protocols use different strate-
gies, most of them share the property that the key is con-
structed from the results of measurements performed by one
of the end-users on quantum particles that have propagated
through an insecure channel. This is the case, for instance,
of the famous Bennett-Brassard-84 [1] and Ekert [2] proto-
cols, and standard DIQKD protocols, such as those intro-
duced in [4, 12]. Notice however that not every QKD protocol
is of this form, a paradigmatic example being measurement-
device-independent QKD [13, 14].
In this work, we consider the above scenario and there-
fore focus on an end-user in a cryptographic protocol who
performs measurements on some quantum systems received
through an insecure channel. We introduce an attack by an
eavesdropper who is able to control the detection efficiency
of the measurements – a natural assumption in the adversary
model of cryptographic protocols based on untrusted mea-
surements, such as 1SDI, SDI, and DI protocols. The attack
also applies to standard prepare-and-measure protocols if one
cannot guarantee that the eavesdropper is unable to tune the
detection efficiencies. In fact recent hacking attacks on stan-
dard QKD protocols have exploited the ability to manipulate
detection efficiencies [3]. Our attack defines detection effi-
ciencies necessary for secure quantum key distribution using
the previous protocols. We then discuss how our attack can
also be applied to schemes for randomness generation. From
a practical point of view, our results imply that the implemen-
tation of partly DI protocols are, in terms of detection effi-
ciency, almost as demanding as fully DI ones. Moreover, our
attack has also implications from a fundamental point of view:
as also observed independently in [15, 16], it implies the exis-
tence of a very weak form of intrinsic randomness in which an
2eavesdropper limited only by the no-signalling principle [17]
cannot a priori fix the outputs of the measurements in a Bell
test, but she can later find out the result of any implemented
measurement. In analogy with results in thermodynamics and
entanglement theory [18] we name this effect bound random-
ness.
I. THE ATTACK
The considered scenario consists of a party, say Bob,
who measures quantum systems received through an insecure
channel. The received systems may have been prepared by
another honest party, say Alice, or by an untrusted source.
In particular, they may be entangled with other quantum sys-
tems. Bob performs on them one of MB possible measure-
ments with D possible outcomes. We label the measurement
choice and result by y = 1, . . . ,MB and b = 1, . . . , D re-
spectively. In the absence of loss, let Bob’s device give the
outcome b with probability Q(b|y, ρ), where ρ is the state of
the system received by Bob and which may be correlated with
classical or quantum variables of other parties in the protocol.
For simplicity in the notation, we omit ρ in what follows, as
our results are independent of it.
In a realistic implementation with losses and inefficient de-
tectors, each measurement of Bob will have a detection ef-
ficiency ηy , and one more outcome is observed, correspond-
ing to the no-click events which we denote by b = ∅. That
different measurements may have different efficiencies natu-
rally arises in certain situations, e.g. in [19]. In such a situa-
tion, Bob’s device then produces outcomes with probabilities
P (b|y) = ηyQ(b|y) for b = 1, . . . , D, and P (∅|y) = 1− ηy .
We exhibit here below a simple attack which allows Eve
to learn the output of any subset G ∈ {1, . . . ,MB} of Bob’s
measurements. This attack does not modify any of Bob’s out-
come probabilities, i.e., it reproduces the full lossy behavior
of Bob’s device. In particular, we stress that it does not rely
on Bob performing any kind of post-selection. The attack re-
quires that Eve is able to tune arbitrarily the detection effi-
ciency of Bob’s detectors depending on the implemented mea-
surement and works as long as Bob’s observed detector effi-
ciencies satisfy
∑
y∈G ηy ≤ 1 − η′, where η′ = maxy/∈G ηy
is the maximum detection efficiency over the set of measure-
ments complementary to G, i.e., those that Eve is not inter-
ested in guessing. (If this complementary set of measurements
is empty, i.e. when Eve wants to guess the output of all of
Bob’s measurement, we define η′ = 0).
In the simple case where all detectors have the same effi-
ciency ηy = η, the attack works whenever η ≤ 1/(|G|+ 1) if
|G| < MB or when η ≤ 1/MB if |G| = MB . In particular,
when Eve is interested in guessing a single one of Bob’s mea-
surements, say y¯, then |G| = 1 and the attack works as long as
η ≤ 1/2. Furthermore, if the detectors are not all equally effi-
cient, Eve can use the inefficiency of the measurements y 6= y¯
that she is not interested in to raise the critical efficiency of
the measurement y¯ that she wants to guess above ηy¯ = 1/2,
as long as ηy¯ ≤ 1−maxy 6=y¯ ηy .
Let us now explain how the attack works. Eve randomly
selects with probability ηy one of the measurement y ∈ G
whose outcomes she wants to guess and with probability
1−∑y∈G ηy she does not select any particular measurement.
Depending on her choice, she then applies one of the two fol-
lowing strategies.
(i) If she picked measurements y¯ ∈ G, she performs this mea-
surement on the incoming state. She obtains outcome b with
probability Q(b|y¯), she reads the outcome, and forwards the
corresponding reduced state to Bob. On Bob’s side, she forces
Bob’s detector to click if he performs measurement y = y¯, in
which case he obtains the same outcome b. If otherwise y 6= y¯,
she instructs Bob’s device not to click, i.e., to output b = ∅.
(ii) If she didn’t select any particular measurement, she di-
rectly forwards the state to Bob without intervention. How-
ever, she instructs Bob’s device not to click (b = ∅) if y ∈ G.
If on the other hand y 6∈ G, she allows his detector to click
with probability τy . Bob then obtains a proper result b with
probability τyQ(b|y) and a no-click result with probability
1− τy .
Obviously, Eve can always correctly guess Bob’s output
when y ∈ G since when Bob’s measuring device clicks, it al-
ways coincides with Eve’s previous measurement result, and
she always knows when his detector does not click (gives out-
come b = ∅). Moreover, defining the τy such that ηy = (1 −∑
y∈G ηy)τy for y /∈ G, it is straightforward that the strategy
yields the overall outcome probabilities P (b|y) = ηyQ(b|y) if
b 6= ∅ and P (∅|y) = 1−ηy , which correspond to lossy devices
characterized by detection efficiencies ηy . The only require-
ment for the τys to be well-defined is that
∑
y∈G ηy ≤ 1− η′,
where η′ = maxy/∈G ηy .
A. Application to QKD protocols
The above attack applies to any cryptographic protocol in
which the key is constructed from the results of measurements
performed by one of the end-users on quantum particles re-
ceived through an insecure channel. It thus applies to any Bell
based DI protocol, but also to SDI approaches where the di-
mension is fixed, protocols based on steering, or prepare-and-
measure protocols, unless the eavesdropper cannot tune Bob’s
detection efficiencies. In fact, in many of these protocols, the
key is constructed from a single measurement, which means
that in the best case scenario (that of equal detection efficien-
cies) they become insecure at η = 1/2. It is important to
notice that the obtained critical detection efficiencies apply to
any scenario, independently of the number of measurements
MB , outputs D, or the role of other parties in the protocol.
By using many measurements for the key generation, one
increases the number of measurements that Eve needs to guess
and the critical detection efficiency for our attack decreases.
However, this solution is demanding from Alice’s and Bob’s
point of view as many more symbols are sacrificed after basis
reconciliation, and also more statistics needs to be collected
to have a proper estimation of the protocol parameters. In fact
the advantage of using more measurements is limited when
considering two distant parties connected by a lossy chan-
nel. Take for instance a rather idealised situation in which all
3losses come from the channel, denoted by ηC and are equal to
ηC = 10
−αL
10 where L is the distance in km. Then, the im-
provement in distance with the number of bases is only loga-
rithmic. For instance, assuming a typical value for the losses
of α of the order of 0.2 dB/km, one has that in order to com-
pensate for the channel losses at 100 km Alice and Bob need
to employ 100 bases.
A possible solution to overcome channel losses is to use
heralded schemes [20, 21] or quantum repeaters based on en-
tanglement swapping [22]. Using such schemes, which are
technologically more demanding, the only relevant losses for
security are those on the honest parties’ labs. Alice and Bob
can then decide which cryptographic solution to adopt, from
standard to fully device-independent, depending on the ob-
served detection inefficiencies and the plausibility of the as-
sumptions needed for security.
Our attack also applies to randomness generation schemes
based on correlations between measurements on two different
devices. In these schemes, randomness is certified by the ob-
served quantumness of the correlations, certified for instance
by means of steering [23, 24] or Bell inequalities [25, 26].
As the particles come from a untrusted source, one cannot
exclude that the attack has been implemented on each of the
particles sent to the untrusted parties in the protocol (one in
the case of steering and two for Bell-based schemes).
In the case of Bell-based protocols, for instance, it is pos-
sible to guess the result of one measurement on each device
when their detection efficiency is 1/2. Note that in the con-
text of randomness expansion, it is usually the case that one
of the possible combinations of measurements is implemented
most of the time, as this requires much less initial randomness
to run the Bell test [26]. For all these protocols, randomness
expansion is lost when the critical detection efficiency is 1/2.
B. Improved attacks
The previous attack applies to many cryptographic scenar-
ios because it is independent of the number of measurements,
outputs and actions by other parties. Improvements however
may be expected for concrete protocols. For instance, we
show in what follows how for two untrusted measuring de-
vices, Eve can improve the attack by exploiting the detection
efficiency of the second party too. Note though that the at-
tack needs more operations from Eve’s side on the untrusted
devices than just varying the detection efficiency of the im-
plemented measurements. This improved attack is inspired by
the local models exploiting detection inefficiencies introduced
in [27].
We thus consider a second party in the protocol, Alice,
who performs MA measurements of D outputs. Her mea-
surement choice and result are labeled by x and a. Again,
in the presence of loss, the output probability distribution has
one more result because of the no-click events and is of the
form P (ab|xy) = η2Q(ab|xy), P (∅b|xy) = η(1− η)Q(b|y),
P (a∅|xy) = η(1 − η)Q(a|x), P (∅∅|xy) = (1 − η)2, where
the detection efficiencies have for simplicity all been taken to
be equal to η.
In the improved attack, Eve’s goal is again to guess G mea-
surements on Bob’s side. With probability q Eve uses the pre-
vious attack and does nothing on Alice’s side. With prob-
ability 1 − q the attack works in the reverse direction: Eve
fixes the output of one of Alice’s measurements (even though
she is still guessing Bob’s result). That is, she picks one of
Alice’s measurements, say x¯, with probability 1/MA, and de-
cides an output for this measurement following the quantum
probability Q(a|x¯). If Alice happens to implement measure-
ment x¯ she will obtain this outcome, otherwise she observes
a no-click. On Bob’s side, Eve computes the reduced state
corresponding to Alice’s result and, for each measurement by
Bob, selects one possible outcome following the probability
Q(b|y, ax) predicted by this state. This defines Bob’s result,
whose detector always clicks. The intuition behind the at-
tack is that for those cases in which Eve fixes Alice’s result,
she can allow any measurement on Bob to give a result, as
Alice effectively implements one single measurement and a
hidden-variable model is enough to describe the observed cor-
relations.
So far the model never gives two no-click events, which
does not correspond to the expected behavior of actual lossy
devices. To correct this, with probability r, Eve runs the above
protocol and with probability 1−r, she instructs both detectors
not to click. We finally get
P (ab|xy) = r
(
q
|G|′ +
1− q
MA
)
Q(ab|xy)
P (a∅|xy) = r q
(
1− 1|G|′
)
Q(a|x)
P (∅b|xy) = r(1− q)
(
1− 1
MA
)
Q(b|y)
P (∅∅|xy) = 1− r = (1− η)2,
(1)
where |G|′ = |G|+ 1 when |G| < MB and |G|′ = |G| when
|G| = MB , as in the previous attack. Tuning the parameters
so that the above probabilities correspond to those of lossy
devices with equal efficiencies η, one finds
η =
|G|′ +MA − 2
|G|′MA − 1 . (2)
It is easy to see that this attack improves over the previous one,
as the corresponding critical detection efficiency is always
larger than 1/|G|′. For example, in the simplest case where
Alice performs 3 measurements, Bob performs two, and Eve
guesses a single outcome, (MA,MB , |G|) = (3, 2, 1), η =
3/5, increasing the critical efficiency by a further 10%. In the
opposite limit, whenMA →∞, η → 1/|G|′, showing that the
advantage of attacking Alice’s measurements decreases with
the number of measurements she performs.
II. BOUND RANDOMNESS
Our results are not only limited to practical aspects of cryp-
tographic protocol implementations, but also have implica-
tions from a more fundamental point of view. Indeed, they im-
ply the existence (see also [15, 16]) of non-local correlations
4with a very weak form of randomness in which an eavesdrop-
per (i) cannot obviously fix the results of all measurements in
advance but (ii) can later predict with certainty the outcome
of any measurement. As mentioned, we dub this effect bound
randomness. Our last result is to show the existence of bound
randomness in the case of eavesdroppers limited only by the
no-signalling principle [17].
The construction of bound randomness relies on a couple of
simple observations. First, in a randomness scenario consist-
ing of two untrusted devices with uniform detection efficiency
η = 1/2, our (primary) attack can be applied to both parties,
so that the eavesdropper learns the result of one measurement
each for Alice and Bob, x¯ and y¯. Let e = (ea, eb) be Eve’s
prediction for Alice and Bob’s outcomes for measurements x¯
and y¯. This variable can take (D + 1)2 possible values cor-
responding to the idealD-valued measurement outcomes plus
the no-detection event. Eve obtains outcome e with a certain
probability Px¯y¯(e) and given e, her attack defines a joint prob-
ability Px¯y¯(ab|xy, e) for Alice and Bob. Since the attack does
not change the expected probabilities P (ab|xy) from Alice
and Bob’s perspective, we have that∑
e
Px¯y¯(abe|xy) = P (ab|xy), (3)
where we have defined the tripartite conditional probabil-
ity distribution Px¯y¯(abe|xy) = Px¯y¯(e)Px¯y¯(ab|xy, e). Now,
the MAMB different attacks defined by each combination of
measurement settings z = (x¯, y¯) can be combined into a sin-
gle tripartite conditional probability distribution
P (abe|xyz) ≡ Pz(abe|xy) (4)
by adding an input z on Eve’s, where z defines the combina-
tion of settings Eve wants to predict. It is easily verified that
this tripartite distribution is no-signalling, see also [28], and
thus represents a valid attack by a no-signalling eavesdrop-
per. By choosing her input z, Eve can steer the ensemble of
non-signalling correlations prepared between Alice and Bob.
Thus, she can choose a posteriori the attack that allows her to
predict the result of any given pair z of implemented measure-
ments. The effect is similar to what happens in the quantum
case when predicting the result of non-commuting variables
on half of a maximally entangled state.
Note now that there exist correlations that are non-local –
hence whose outcomes cannot all be fixed in advance – even
when the detection efficiency is smaller than 1/2 – hence
whose outcomes can all be perfectly guessed by Eve a pos-
teriori using the above construction. Examples of such corre-
lations were given in [29], where it was shown that the critical
detection efficiency required to close the detection loophole
decreases exponentially with the dimension of the measured
quantum state in a scenario in which the number of measure-
ments by Alice and Bob is exponentially large. More gen-
erally, any non-local correlations obtained for detection effi-
ciencies η ≤ 1/2 constitute examples of bound randomness.
Finally, it can be explicitly checked that both the all-versus
nothing example of [30] and the Peres-Mermin magic square
[31] exhibit bound randomness [32].
III. CONCLUSIONS
We have provided a simple and general detection attack that
allows an eavesdropper to guess some of (or all) the mea-
surement results in a cryptographic protocol. It applies ba-
sically to any protocol with untrusted detectors in which she
is able to tune the detection efficiency of untrusted devices.
Obviously our attack cannot be applied to protocols in which
the key is not constructed from measurement results, such as
in measurement-device-independent schemes [13, 14]. These
protocols, almost by definition, are only sensitive to attacks
on the devices that prepare the quantum states. The generality
of our attack also implies that the implementation of partly DI
solutions is, from the point of view of detection efficiency, al-
most as demanding as DI ones, which, in turn, offer stronger
security.
Interestingly, the critical detection efficiency corresponding
to our attack only depends on the number of measurements
that Eve wants to learn, but is independent of the total number
of measurements MB , number of outputs D, or dimension of
the quantum systems used.
We have also presented an improved attack that applies to
protocols with two untrusted detectors. In this attack, the
eavesdropper exploits the detection inefficiencies of one of the
parties to improve her attack on the other party. More gener-
ally, it would be interesting to derive a formalism to study the
robustness of concrete protocols to detection attacks, as these
are the most advanced at the moment. This will allow us to
understand for which protocols the detection bounds for secu-
rity derived here are tight. An analysis of the tightness of our
attack in steering scenarios will be presented in [24].
Finally, our results imply also the existence of a bound ran-
domness, an intriguing and weak form of certified random-
ness. In a scenario in which an eavesdropper is limited only by
the no-signalling principle, there exist non-local correlations
for which she can find out a posteriori the results of any imple-
mented measurements. A final open question is to understand
if this form of randomness exists in the quantum case, that is,
when the eavesdropper is limited by the quantum formalism.
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